**Grand Strategy of the Larantuka Kingdom: A Historical Perspective**

**Hariyono1, Daya Negri Wijaya\*12, Deny Yudo Wahyudi1**

1(History Department, Universitas Negeri Malang, Jl. Semarang 5 Malang, 65145 Telp. (0341) 551312 Malang, Indonesia, [daya.negri.fis@um.ac.id](mailto:daya.negri.fis@um.ac.id))

2(Center for Economics Humanities and Tourism, Research Institute and Community Engagement, Universitas Negeri Malang, Jl. Semarang 5 Malang, 65145 Telp. (0341) 551312 Malang, Indonesia)

Received: 2021-October-15 (10-Calibri Light)

Rev. Req: 2022-January-09

Accepted: 2022-January-22

E:\DERGILER\ortak-kaynaklar-gorseller\Doi-1024x629 - Kopya.jpg 10.5758/ijls.2022.1

|  |
| --- |
| How to cite this paper: Pilotti, M. & Almubarak. H. A. M. (2021). Systematic Versus Informal Application of Culturally Relevant Pedagogy: Are Performance Outcomes Different? A Study of College Students. *Journal of Culture and Values in Education*, *4*(2), 14-26. <https://doi.org/10.5758/ijls.2022.1>  This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license [(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) |

**ABSTRACT:** *This paper aims to assess the success and failure of the Larantuka Kingdom during the colonial period. Larantuka played the diplomatic gift and maintained its military infrastructure to run its political and economic affairs in the East Lesser Sunda Islands. The study used a historical approach to reconstruct early modern Larantuka and reflect on the current national strategy. This paper, therefore, proposes the theory of grand strategy to analyse the dynamics of early modern Larantuka. This study found that political-economic and religious diplomacy had affected the transition of Larantuka's traditional state system into a Catholic kingdom. The capacity of state leaders, political-economic alliances, diplomacy, and military power also determined the rise of the Larantuka Kingdom in the 17th century. A strong military and political network should be followed by resource utilisation. Allies and partners greatly impacted Larantuka’s power and sustainability. Finally, state leader shifting and decision-making became the pivotal factors in the failure and decline of the Larantuka Kingdom in the 20th century.*

**Keywords:** *diplomacy; grand strategy; Larantuka; military infrastructure; political economy.*

1. **INTRODUCTION**

Larantuka is located in the eastern coast of Flores Island. Flores along with other Lesser Sunda Islands consisting of Solor, Adonara, Lomblen (Lembata), Ende, Pantar, Alor, Sumba, Savu, Roti and Timor were famous for producing sandalwood (Matos, 1995, p. 99; Teixeira, 1963, p. 81). Larantuka lies within the Larantuka Strait, which separates Flores Island from Adonara Island. Its location was strategically more advantageous and less dependent on its livelihood on the neighbouring islands (Abdurachman, 2008, p. 79; Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014, pp. 42–43). For early modern Portuguese, Larantuka had a safe bay and was protected by two small islands directly adjacent, namely Adonara and Solor Islands. Larantuka Harbor was a well-protected natural harbour from the storm. The area near the seaside was quite productive, so it could be planted. From the side, Larantuka's defence was very good, because there was a naval blockade so that the locals were protected when leaving for another seaside area (Samingan & Roe, 2021). Early modern Larantuka played a pivotal role as a trading hub for sandalwood commerce. If the northern coast of Flores served the spice trade from the Moluccas to Java and Malacca, the south coast of Flores including Larantuka facilitated the sandalwood trade (along with beeswax and honey) from the Lesser Sunda Islands, especially Sumba and Timor to China (Macao during the Portuguese hegemony) and India (Abdurachman, 2008, p. 59).

The growth of the commercial economy drove the locals to organise a political entity. It was important to organise and secure all affairs in a political state. The local elites had organised Larantuka and its dependencies before the Europeans came (Abdurachman, 2008; Hurit, 2015; Kerans, 2016; A. K. H. Tokan, 2023; F. Tokan, 2023; Vatter, 1984). Unfortunately, the previous studies frequently analyse the Larantuka Kingdom from a religious perspective. It was recognised as a Catholic kingdom, and its development was closely linked to the influence of European colonial powers, particularly the Portuguese. The teaching of Christianity had significantly shaped the kingdom's political structure and social norms. The local elites, either the Hornay or Costa families, kept integrating the local customs and governance systems into Larantuka’s political administration. Even the local elites resisted the Portuguese rule if the Portuguese complicated the local’s interest in the sandalwood trade. The previous studies are silent to analyse the lessons learnt from the history of Larantuka. Meanwhile, a lot of studies have studied several case studies from historical perspectives and promoted the meaning and values from history for the stakeholders (Agatha, 2016) (Malakyan, 2013) (Dilley, 2013) (Elius et al., 2020).

This study intends to revisit the Larantuka kingdom from a historical perspective. This paper will analyse Larantuka’s diplomacy and military power to encounter the geopolitical upheavals during the first global era. This paper could also propose the lesson learnt for the readers after visiting the strengths and weaknesses of the Larantuka Kingdom.

1. **METHOD**

This study used a historical approach to re-narrate the history of the Larantuka Kingdom based on all available sources, both local and European (Herlina, 2020). Given the abundant availability of literature, this study is possible to conduct. The existence of oral traditions could be used to reconstruct political history in Larantuka during the trading period. In addition, the existence of Portuguese and Dutch archives and chronicles could also complement information related to the development of the traditional state in Larantuka. The diversity of sources requires careful listening. Differences in perspective can make researchers confused and disoriented. There needs to be cross-verification between the historical sources obtained. Not only to minimize subjectivity. However, exploring various perspectives can help us understand the circumstances of an event. In this position, verification occupies an important position. Without us realising it, when sorting and selecting or comparing information from various sources. Indirectly, we try to analyse or interpret an event. Synthesis as a result of thinking will be realised when it has been poured into writing. This study also used grand strategy theory to analyse a historical phenomenon related to the power dynamics, diplomatic relations, political-economic interest and the influence of all military and non-military elements on the existence of the Larantuka Kingdom during the pre-colonial period to the colonial period. This paper was written in a literary style. Therefore, the resulting historiography would be easier to read and understand.

1. **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

**GRAND STRATEGY OF TRADITIONAL STATES IN THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO**

The grand strategy can be understood both theoretically and practically (Wey & Harun, 2018). Grand strategy can be used as a tool to assess the success and failure of a country's power. In addition, a grand strategy is expected to be a bridge between economic, political, and military objectives to maintain the country's interests in the long term (Starr, 1993). Grand strategy can also be understood as a principle or grand design in the form of a vision, idea and main design of a country. Grand strategy can guide and provide decisions in interacting with internal and external parties in the international governance system (Onea, 2020).

In practical terms, a grand strategy may use diplomacy and statecraft aided by military force to confront and overcome external threats. This strategy aims to maintain power, gain economic advantage, and expand influence (Wey & Harun, 2018). The main objective of grand strategy lies in state policy. The policy in question is the power or state's leader's capacity to unite all non-military and military elements to achieve the state's interests, and the state's welfare and sustainability, both during peace and war conditions. These elements include the implementation and assessment of diplomacy; the fulfilment of the state's interests; political culture; morale; and economic resources including industry; natural resources; finance; manpower and the military (Starr, 1993).

In the pre-colonial period, several kingdoms and sultanates used grand strategies for their political interests and goals. Srivijaya is a model of a traditional state that used a grand strategy to become a superpower empire. For Srivijaya, the geopolitical and geo-economic situation in the Malacca Strait could be considered a threat to the region on the North Coast of Sumatra. At this time, the ports in Palembang and Jambi became the connecting route for trade activities between the Western Nusantara region and Asian trading ports. This made the Srivijaya Kingdom have a relationship with Chinese merchants (Wolters, 1967). In 682, the Srivijaya Kingdom competed with Jambi for the Batang Hari River trade route. This competition was won by the Srivijaya Kingdom so that it was able to control the international trade route as well as the Jambi region. However, Srivijaya's territory was vulnerable to rebellion from the hinterland and external attacks (Hall, 1985). Therefore, the Srivijaya rulers initiated a defensive military policy to protect the overall interests of the kingdom (Wolters, 1967).

Likewise, the Majapahit Kingdom under the control of Patih Gajah Mada, successfully used a grand strategy to expand its territory to include parts of Southeast Asia (Manggala, 2013). The existence of the political power of the Majapahit Kingdom can be seen when King Hayam Wuruk ruled in the 14th and 15th centuries. At that time, Majapahit often sent envoys and military fleets to various parts of the archipelago with the aim of trade relations, diplomacy and territorial conquest. In addition, the Majapahit Kingdom established political-economic relations with kingdoms and countries in the Southeast Asian region for the continued benefit of the kingdom (Munandar, 2020).

In addition to these two kingdoms, the Sultanate of Malacca also applied the concept of grand strategy to its government system. In the 15th century, Malacca was the centre of Islamic civilization that spread its influence throughout the Malay Archipelago. In that period, the last Sultan of Malacca, Sultan Mahmud Syah, made a political policy to legitimize the Malacca region as the New Mecca. This was motivated by the influence of Malacca at the time which became the center of international trade during the 15th century. In addition, the Sultan of Malacca also made a Malacca sea law policy to maintain social harmony in Malacca and protect Malacca trade from external threats including the Portuguese (Wijaya, 2022).

The Sultanate of Aceh also applied the concept of grand strategy to its government system when it was led by Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636). In the 17th century period, the Sultanate of Aceh experienced a period of glory. This is inseparable from the role and influence of Sultan Iskandar Muda. The Sultan is believed to have created significant changes and successes when fighting the Portuguese in Malacca. The Sultan intensified the policy of inclusive commercial legislation and the expansion of territory to the entire Malay Archipelago. Therefore, in the 17th century, the Sultanate of Aceh was considered a new political, economic and military power in the archipelago. The heyday of the Sultanate of Aceh is a historical fact because Sultan Iskandar Muda was able to make Banda Aceh a cosmopolitan city and was able to transform it into a maritime city (Lombard, 1986).

In Java, the grand strategy was also applied by the Islamic Mataram. In the fifteenth century, Majapahit's power declined, and Islamic-based political entities emerged (Ricklefs, 2007). Successively, Demak, Pajang and Islamic Mataram took turns to rule Java. In the XVII century, the power and influence of the Islamic Mataram Sultanate grew rapidly. Islamic Mataram controlled the main cities on the North Coast of Java (de Graaf & Pigeaud, 1985). In 1641, after Sultan Agung Hanyakrakusuma reigned, Mataram was able to control and monopolize trade in East and Central Java and Madura with its military power. The power of Islamic Mataram in Java was recognized by Palembang, Banjarmasin and Jambi through several agreements involving the VOC (Surya & Puji, 2024). Islamic Mataram geopolitically competed with the VOC to monopolize trade in Java. The sultanate was known as a rice producer and was able to establish a trade network with Malacca and tried to ally itself against the VOC. With its natural resources, economic strength and strong military, Islamic Mataram was able to monopolize the VOC's rice supply and became the basis of Islamic power in Java in the 17th century (Surya & Puji, 2024).

The grand strategy was also applied by the sultanates in the Maluku Islands, namely Ternate and Tidore. The Sultanate of Ternate and the Sultanate of Tidore are known as forces capable of controlling several regions and civilizations in the Maluku Islands. Geopolitically, the two sultanates competed in economic, political and military terms to become the main force in the Maluku Islands. The southern region was controlled by Tidore, while the northern region was controlled by Ternate. Both sultanates had a major spice commodity, cloves. This commodity was much sought after by Europeans in the 15th century period. They visited these two regions. The first Europeans to arrive were the Portuguese, who then allied with the Sultanate of Ternate. After that, the Spanish also allied with the Sultanate of Tidore. Diplomatic relations in economic, political and military terms with these Europeans further strengthened the competition and opposition between the Sultanate of Ternate and the Sultanate of Tidore during the period of the 15th century to the 17th century in the Maluku Islands (Andaya, 1993).

**RISE AND DECLINE OF LARANTUKA KINGDOM**

It is difficult to narrate the foundation of the Larantuka Kingdom. There is no record to reconstruct the earlier days of the kingdom. The historians of Larantuka merely depend on the Larantuka folklore, as in:

“Initially, Larantuka was inhabited by the native Ile Jadi residents coming from Mount Mandiri (Ile Mandiri) which stood firmly behind Larantuka City. Previously, on the top of Ile Mandiri, there was an egg that was being hatched by an eagle. Which then hatched into two human children, respectively Liang Nuru (male) and Watowele or Putri Ile Jadi (female). The two human children were looked after by a genie, at that time they were not yet dressed and their entire bodies were hairy and had long, pointed nails. They built a house at the top of Ile Mandiri and then they agreed to live separately, Wato Wele to the east while his brother went to Likat Lamaboting Lama Bunk (located behind Ile Mandiri). One day Wato Wele was visited by a man named Patigolok Arakiang from the island of Timor using a canoe. They then married and had three children, namely Kudi Lelenbala (who occupied the Waibalun area), Padu Ile Pook Wolo (who later became king of Larantuka), and Lahalapang (who inherited the population of Balela village). Pati Golok as the founding father of the Larantuka kingdom then passed on power to his son Padu Ile to rule Larantuka. Then, the government was handed over to Sira Demong Pagomolong (1338-1357??), who succeeded in uniting all the regions in East Flores into the Larantuka kingdom” (Yoseph, 2010).

It is interesting to discuss the powerful king, Sira Demong Pagomolong. If we can connect it with the story of Demung (Demong) and Paji (Panji), we could analyse further the king’s identity and expansion to East Flores. Either Demung or Paji is a Javanese Prince or the legitimised king of Larantuka or Galiyao under the Majapahit hegemony (Abdurachman, 2008, p. 83). Demung, as narrated by Prapanca, led his people to capture East Flores during the 14th century. Under Larantuka, East Flores was divided into ten villages, called Lewopulo. King Sira Demong acted as a government chief, assisted by five local tribe representatives (Pou Suku Lema). Those representatives were the second-ranking noblemen after the king. Pou Suku Lema controlled Kabelen Lewo or the village chief and the tribal chief (Yoseph, 2010). This local governance model enabled Larantuka to defend its independence and assert its influence over surrounding areas, contributing to its rise as a prominent kingdom in the region (Aritonang & Steenbrink, 2008).

The rise of the Larantuka Kingdom can be attributed to geographical advantages, strategic trade relationships, and the integration of religious practices that shaped its identity. Situated on the eastern part of Flores Island, Larantuka's location along vital maritime trade routes facilitated economic interactions with various cultures, enhancing its prominence as a trading hub in the region. This maritime connectivity allowed Larantuka to engage in trade with neighbouring islands and foreign powers, contributing to its economic growth and political significance (Maran et al., 2022).

Larantuka is, etymologically, formed by two words of laran and tuka. The first refers to Jalan or a way, and the latter deals with tengah or middle. Therefore, Larantuka could be understood as a middle way or a place to stay. Historically, the locals also called Larantuka with Lewonamang. Lewonamang could be known as a meeting place or the kingdom's capital. Before the Europeans came, Larantuka had already hosted cross-national merchants and adventurers. From the 11th to 13th centuries, Larantuka was a home for the autochthones of the Ile Jadi tribe, people from the western part of the Indonesian archipelago (Sina Jawa Communities); and people from the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago (Tena Mau Tribe). It might be a result of Larantuka’s commercial connection to the Javanese of Majapahit (Yoseph, 2010).

During the 15th century, Majapahit lost its control to East Flores. The Islamic merchants from Java tried to have a political inheritance. They forced Larantuka to serve the Islamic states in Java. Therefore, the locals tried to find other allies and negotiated cooperation with the Portuguese in the early 16th century. On the other side, the Portuguese also required the trading post in Flores. They wanted to link the sandalwood trade from Timor to Flores before transporting it to Malacca. In East Flores, the Portuguese established two ports, Ende and Larantuka. For the Portuguese, Larantuka had a calm bay because it was protected by two islands, namely Adonara and Solor. Larantuka Harbor was a good natural harbour because it was protected from raging storms. The area around the coast is quite fertile, so the corn planted by the Portuguese grows well. From a defence perspective, Larantuka was also very pleasant because even though there was a sea blockade, residents could cross the interior and get to other coastal areas. It was at this port that traders built safe villages with tall houses and spacious gardens. This situation did not last long because pirates appeared from Java and Sulawesi who looted villages on the coast. Another enemy of the Portuguese in Larantuka was Dutch ships which began arriving around 1600 to search for spices and sandalwood in the Flores Sea (Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014).

During the Portuguese period, the local women were married by the Portuguese-speaking merchants. Today, people call their offsprings with the Topasses. The Topasses, also known as Larantuqueiros or Black Portuguese, emerged during the 17th century as a result of the blending of Portuguese colonial influences with local Timorese traditions. This group formed a unique identity through a process of cultural merging, significantly influenced by the presence of Portuguese missionaries and traders in the region. Historically, the Topasses were characterized by their Catholic faith and their opposition to Dutch colonial powers, particularly the Dutch East India Company (VOC). They were involved in trade and often acted as middlemen in the commerce of sandalwood and other goods, which were highly sought after during the colonial period. Their activities included the slave trade, where Topasses from Larantuka and Lifau engaged in raiding and selling slaves, primarily to markets in Java and Macau (Pinto, 1829).

Before the Topas of Larantuka controlled the sandalwood trade networks in the mid-17th century, Larantuka did not have any power to manage the sandalwood trade. It merely served the colonisers from the Javanese of Majapahit to the Europeans. Under the Majapahit rule, the kings of Majapahit expanded its territory to the East, including Larantuka. Mpu Prapanca, the author of Nagarakrtagama, informed that Majapahit captured Larantuka in the 14th century. At that time, the Javanese called Larantuka with Galiyao. All products were sent to Java and re-sold again to either local or foreign merchants (Barnes, 1982).

Majapahit also expanded to the west of the Indonesian archipelago. In the early 15th century, Majapahit determined the geopolitics of the Straits of Malacca. Majapahit was connected by regular trade to Sumatra. Palembang and surrounding countries in South Sumatra submitted to the Majapahit king. Meanwhile, Majapahit had established trade with Pasai in the northern tip of Sumatra. King Megat Iskandar Shah, the second ruler of Malacca, sent his envoys to Java. King Megat Iskandar Shah instructed his men to inform the Majapahit king that his father had passed away and past differences between Malacca and Majapahit should be ended. The Malaccan king also proposed to establish a friendly trade between Malacca and Java. The envoys asked the Majapahit king to distribute the Javanese merchandise, including spices, to Malacca. The Malaccan ambassador argued that selling their products in Malacca could decrease the risk of sailing from Java to Pasai (Pires, 1944, p. 239).

The King of Majapahit did not have a problem with the Malaccan proposal. However, the Malaccan king should consider that the Java-Pasai trade had been established for a long time. The Javanese merchants also had a privilege. They received a huge profit and did not pay any customs duties in Pasai. The Malaccan king sent his envoys to Pasai to negotiate, directing the Javanese merchants to Malacca. He also persuaded the Pasai officials to allow their merchants to populate Malacca. Malacca could provide gold to be exchanged for Pasai’s merchandise. Pasai would accept the Malaccan proposal if Malacca could embrace Islam. The Malaccan king tried to ignore the Pasai offer and kept sending his envoys to Java. He sent elephants and gifts to the Majapahit king. Some Javanese junks began to call at Malacca (Pires, 1944, pp. 239–240).

The Java-Malacca trade began to establish. The Javanese merchants started to populate Malacca. They brought cloves, mace, nutmeg, and sandalwood to Malacca. Their presence in Malacca attracted Muslim merchant communities to come. They needed the Javanese merchandise to be re-sold in Pasai. Despite the duties imposed, it was still a lucrative trade for Pasai merchants (Pires, 1944, pp. 240–241).

During the reign of Sultan Mansur Shah (1456-1477), the sultan sent the envoys accompanied by the Kings of Indragiri, Palembang, Jambi, Lingga and Tungkal to Majapahit. After gifting an elephant to the king, the Majapahit king conferred upon the Malaccan envoys with royal cloth and ceremonial knife. The king of Majapahit also allowed Sultan Mansur Shah to marry his daughter, Raden Galuh Candra Kirana, and granted South Sumatra to Malacca. This political marriage not merely reinforced the Malaccan hegemony on Sumatra but also allowed Sumatran pepper to be re-exported from Malacca (Adil, 1974, p. 31; Shellabear, 1989, p. 112).

During the reign of Sultan Mahmud Shah (1488-1511), Javanese merchants' role was pivotal. In Malacca, there were many Javanese rich merchants, such as Patih Adam, Patih Kadir, Patih Yusof, Patih Yunus, and Utimutaraja. Those merchants could link Malacca to the Lesser Sunda Islands and the Spice Islands. The Javanese merchants sailed and carried the Indian cloths to the Spice Islands via the Lesser Sunda Islands. They sailed from Malacca to the south and anchored at Sunda, where they loaded foodstuffs and pepper. They sailed along the northern coast of Java and called at a port in the Lesser Sunda Islands. If they called at Bima or Sumbawa, they could benefit from the abundance good drinking water and foodstuffs. They also exchanged their textile products with dyewood and slaves. If they called at Flores, they could swap their Indian textiles with Sulphur. If they preferred Timor to be visited, they could have sandalwood for their cloth. From the Lesser Sunda Islands, they sailed to the east and reached Banda where they found mace and nutmeg; and the Moluccas where the cloves came from(Hashim, 1989, pp. 249–250; Meilink-Roelofsz, 1962, pp. 86–87; Shellabear, 1989, p. 177).

Malacca Sultanate had facilitated the multinational merchants to conduct trade since its foundation. Malacca also sent its embassies to potential political trading partners. Malacca requested those kings to allow their merchants to populate Malacca, by playing a policy of diplomatic gifts with the Siamese Kingdom, the Ming Dynasty of China, the Majapahit Kingdom of Java, the Pasai Sultanate, the Vijayanagara Kingdom, and the Cambay Sultanate. Under the Chinese tributary system, Malacca began to expand its territory to the Malay World. Malacca should control both sides of the Malacca Straits to determine political stability and to secure the port city of Malacca. By doing so, it also forced all Malay products to be exported from Malacca. The initiatives of the Malaccan rulers had transformed Malacca into a main seaport in Southeast Asia.

Traders from Malacca came to Solor to buy the sulphur there. Additionally, the Chinese had traveled to Timor to obtain Timor's highly prized Sandalwood. They used the wood as perfume and incense. They seemed to know the existence of sandalwood. They periodically sent ships there. Sandalwood had been sold via Malacca to places as far away as Cochin-China. However, the existence of Malacca as a trading center throughout the 15th century reduced the intensity of direct trade from China to the Lesser Sunda Islands. For them, the existence of the Malacca market reduced the risks and costs of shipping. Indian traders were also other distributors. They bought a lot of sandalwood to reprocess it into ointments, and perfumes, and as a complement to cremation and sacrifice ceremonies. For European consumers, sandalwood could also be a raw material for medicines (Meilink-Roelofsz, 2016, pp. 84–85 & 101–102).

The Europeans began to visit the Lesser Sunda Islands after the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511. The Portuguese tried to find where the sandalwood came from after realizing the sandalwood price at Malacca was two and half times higher than the importers buying at Timor. The Portuguese sent António de Abreu and his fleet to the Spice Islands via the Lesser Sunda Islands. He recognised that these islands were famous for producing sandalwood (Matos, 1995, p. 99; Teixeira, 1963, p. 81). In 1514, the Portuguese Captain in Malacca, Rui de Brito Patalim, planned to send ships, but, did not have junks to sail to Timor. He wanted to fetch sandalwood, honey, and wax from Timor (Carta de Rui de Brito Patalim, Capitão de Malaca, Para Afonso de Albuquerque, Governador Das Índias, Sobre a Situação de Malaca, 1514, pp. 54 & 71–72; Teixeira, 1963, p. 81). In 1515, the first contact between the Portuguese and Timor began. The Portuguese made regular voyages to the Lesser Sunda Islands, landing mainly in the Amabeno and Mena regions of Timor. They also visited Solor, facing a better climate and a safe anchorage to wait for the suitable monsoon to return. During their stay, they built some huts and loaded the cargoes of sandalwood. While the Portuguese merchants returned to Malacca, the Dominican Order remained to establish a permanent settlement in Solor (Matos, 1995, pp. 101–102; Villiers, 1985, p. 65). In 1516, the Portuguese fleet under Jorge Fogaça sailed to Timor. It succeeded in trading sandalwood and returned to Malacca. Jorge Fogasa shared the provision with Jorge de Brito, who sent his servants to accompany Jorge Fogasa. Both made a massive profit from selling sandalwood to private Portuguese and Asian merchants in Malacca (Carta de Pedro de Faria, Capitão de Malaca, Ao Rei D. João III, Sobre a Fortaleza de Malaca, Sobre Banda, Molucas e Outros Assuntos, 1517, pp. 337–359; Smith, 1970, p. 56).

From 1516 to 1556, the Portuguese might have traded sandalwood with the local merchants. When the Portuguese merchants came to Solor, the trading vessels also brought religious preachers. In 1556, Friar Antonio Taveira came to Solor (Matos, 1995, p. 102). He converted a significant number of the local inhabitants. His presence in the Lesser Sunda Islands did not come about by chance. He might have been sent because he had previously been sent to Timor for a specific purpose (Matos, 1995, p. 103). In 1558, a secular priest was sent to preach to the newly converted Christians, but he did not visit them and preferred to trade instead (Carta Do Padre Baltasar Dias Ao Padre Provincial Da India, Malaca, 1559, p. 345; Teixeira, 1963, p. 83). During the 1560s, the Dominicans frequented the Lesser Sunda Islands. In 1561, four Dominicans left Malacca to preach the Catholic doctrine in Solor. In 1566, Fr. António Taveira baptised five thousand people on Timor, Flores, and Solor (Matos, 1995, p. 104; Villiers, 1985, p. 65).

Unlike Portuguese and Asian merchants who did not have permanent settlements in the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Dominicans opened the first Portuguese settlement and a monastery in Solor. By 1566, Fr. António da Cruz had built a fort with five bulwarks, made of lime and stone, to protect the Catholics from the Muslim invaders. The Javanese then besieged Solor from the sea, until a Portuguese ship from the Moluccas attacked and destroyed the Javanese junks, killing many of the crews. The rival threat led Friar António da Cruz to strengthen his defence and build a solid stone fortress. With the help of the locals and a donation from the State of India, the fortification was started in 1566. While the defence was under construction, the Dominicans did not neglect their spiritual work. They continually opened new Christian communities, for instance, in Lamala (Adonara) and Flores (Boxer, 1968, pp. 173–175; Teixeira, 1963, p. 84; Villiers, 1985, pp. 104–105).

After the Portuguese resided, married the locals and constructed the fortress in Solor, the Portuguese Casados took over the control of the sandalwood trade. The Portuguese began to export the sandalwood to Malacca and later to Macao. The Malacca-Solor business did not run without any risk. The Javanese and Dutch merchants frequently attacked the Portuguese crews. In 1564, the Javanese junks surrounded and blocked Solor. The Portuguese ship from the Moluccas rescued and forced the Javanese to escape. In 1568, the Javanese also had another siege, but the Portuguese could defeat them. The Portuguese had established a Christian settlement and converted a thousand souls to embrace Catholicism in Solor and the surrounding islands. Nevertheless, the local resistance had threatened the Portuguese authority, as the people of Lamakera did in 1598 (Boxer, 1968, pp. 175–176; Matos, 1995, pp. 124–125; Villiers, 1985, pp. 70–72).

In the late 16th century, the Portuguese Captains in Malacca had the exclusive right to send their vessels or sell their rights for the voyage of Malacca-Solor. The Portuguese in Solor organised a political administration, erected another fort in Ende in 1595, and levied the incoming vessels since 1611. They used these fiscal revenues to pay the official salaries. The growth of Solor attracted the Dutch to invade in 1613. The Portuguese moved their power and settlement to Larantuka. Larantuka became prosperous after being the Portuguese capital in the Lesser Sunda Islands. By the 1620s, the Portuguese linked Larantuka to Malacca and Makasar, where they could barter sandalwood with various Asian merchandise. When the Dutch captured Malacca in 1641, The Portuguese in Larantuka still survived after running a long-distance trade with Macao since 1639 (Boxer, 1968, p. 177; Lobato, 1999, p. 278; Matos, 1995, pp. 126–127; Villiers, 1985, pp. 72 & 75–76).

The Dutch had control of Solor for several times. However, the Dutch left Solor after they witnessed the earthquake in 1648. The Portuguese in Larantuka experienced significant growth. The Javanese and Chinese ships regularly called at Larantuka. When the Dutch captured Makassar in 1660, the Portuguese transferred their bureaucracy to Larantuka. All the Portuguese and the Portuguese-speaking men stayed and opened the new settlement in Larantuka. They married the locals and created the mixed race of the Topasses (Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014, pp. 100–101).

Larantuka was led by the descendants of two famous families who competed with each other throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. The first was the Costa family, which came from Portuguese descent and nobles from Timor. Second, the Hornay family were descendants of Hornay, a former VOC commander in Solor who defected to Larantuka. Until 1750, these two families fought for power in Flores and its surroundings, they attacked, robbed and killed each other. In 1750, they agreed to make peace and implement a rotating system of power (Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014, p. 101). They had a common enemy, namely the VOC and the Alliance of the Five Coasts (Adonara, Lamahala, Terong, Lohayong, and Lamakera). The Larantuka rulers began to influence other areas such as Sikka, Lio and Ende to support their political movements. They were an independent force. During the 17th and 18th centuries, only two Portuguese ships sailed from Goa to Larantuka and no official representatives of the Kingdom visited Larantuka (Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014, p. 102).

At the end of the 17th century, Larantuka leaders began to see that the trade in sandalwood from Timor was very profitable. They were involved in controlling the sandalwood trade. Using their armed forces, the Larantuka leaders imposed a monopoly on local rulers (liurai). In 1640, they sent their fleet to capture Lifau, north of Timor. In 1675, Antonio da Hornay crowned himself as uncrowned king of Timor, after marrying the daughter of the king of Ambeno in Timor. He had the power to regulate the sandalwood trade traffic, raise prices, and even prohibit the sale of sandalwood to foreign traders (Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014, p. 103).

Portugal felt that Larantuka's expansion into Timor was not being carried out in Portugal's name. Therefore, the Governor of Macau sent Antonio Coelho Guerreiro with one hundred soldiers to open a base in Timor. Guerreiro had mediation with the King of Larantuka, Domingos da Costa. But the king threw him out. Guerreiro finally landed at Lifau and built a fort out of mud. King Larantuka considered the Portuguese's actions to be an infiltration attempt. Larantuka troops then surrounded the fort. Many Portuguese troops starved to death until Guerreiro surrendered to the Topaz people (Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014, p. 104).

The golden age of the Larantuka kingdom ended in 1859 when the Portuguese were forced to surrender Flores to the Dutch after long negotiations. The Dutch wanted the Flores region because they saw its economic and strategic potential as a trade route for spices and sandalwood. The Dutch then took over the government of the Larantuka kingdom and turned it into a residency led by a Dutch resident.

However, the Dutch did not immediately abolish the monarchy system in the Larantuka kingdom. The Dutch recognised the existence of local kings coming from the Larantuka noble family. These local kings were given the authority to manage traditional and religious affairs in their respective regions. However, they had to comply with the policies and regulations set by the Dutch colonial government. Apart from that, they also had to pay taxes and tribute to the Dutch as a sign of recognition of their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the people and kings of Larantuka were not happy with the Dutch colonialism. The locals seemed to preserve their rights and freedoms. Unfortunately, the Dutch interfered in their internal affairs. Moreover, the spread of Protestant Christianity carried out by Dutch missionaries also threatened Catholicism.

In 1904, the people and kings of Larantuka rebelled against the Dutch colonial government. King Don Lorenzo II from the Sikka Kingdom, which was one of the vassal kingdoms of the Larantuka Kingdom, led the rebellion against the Dutch. King Don Lorenzo II succeeded in gathering support from other kings in Flores such as King Don Alfonso from the Adonara Kingdom and King Don Do Minggus from the Lembata Kingdom. This rebellion lasted several months. However, it was finally extinguished by Dutch military forces with the help of several local pro-Dutch ethnic groups such as aid from several local pro-Dutch ethnic groups such as the Ende tribe and the Ngada tribe. Many people and kings of Larantuka were killed or captured in this battle.

After the rebellion was successfully suppressed, the Dutch then officially dissolved the Larantuka Kingdom in 1904. The territory of this kingdom was then divided into several districts, which were ruled by a Dutch resident controller or assistant. The monarchy system, which had existed since the 13th century, ended in Flores. Thus, the golden age of the Larantuka Kingdom ended tragically under Dutch colonial rule. However, the cultural and religious heritage of the Larantuka Kingdom has been preserved to this day.

**GRAND STRATEGY OF LARANTUKA KINGDOM**

The East Nusa Tenggara region has been known as a sandalwood producing area since the seventh century (Jebarus, 2017). In this area there is one of the local kingdoms, the Larantuka Kingdom. In the XIII century, the Larantuka Kingdom was able to establish relations with the Majapahit Kingdom in terms of political economy. Later, this kingdom became the territory of Majapahit (Cribb & Kahin, 2004). The Larantuka Kingdom is geographically part of the Sawu Sea, which consists of several large islands in East Nusa Tenggara (Pradjoko, 2017).

Historically, the formation of the Larantuka Kingdom is related to the folklore of paji and demon. The story of paji and demon is a mythology that developed in the East Flores region. This story tells of the conflict and competition between two local rulers, namely paji (Larantuka Kingdom) and demon (Adorana Kingdom). Therefore, the paji and demon story represents the beginning of the formation of the Larantuka Kingdom and internal conflicts involving political, economic and military aspects with the Adonara Kingdom in the East Flores region (Barnes, 1987).

The dispute between the paji and demon groups occurred in the late 16th century when the Lamaholot tribe split into two groups. This split is believed to be a conflict between two brothers involving the Larantuka Kingdom and the Adonara Kingdom. The Larantuka Kingdom is a demon people, a community that lives in the highlands or mountains. While the Adonara Kingdom is the paji people, a community that lives in the coastal area. This folktale relates to the competing influences of Islam and Catholicism in East Flores and the trade network at the end of the 16th century (Hägerdal, 2012).

In the early modern period, Europeans had an influence on local power in their colonies, especially in East Flores. This influence was in all aspects of the colonies that were related to the grand strategy. The power of Europeans was able to influence and even intervene in the power of traditional governments ranging from economic, political, cultural, religious and military aspects. With this power and influence, Europeans in their colonies were very difficult to expel because the West was able to offer military protection, economic networks and political positions to the King and local rulers in the colonies. This was used by the Kings and local rulers for their interests and goals, especially in terms of geopolitical competition with the opposing party. Therefore, the influence and intervention of these powerful Europeans became one of the reasons why the kings and local rulers in Southeast Asia could accept the influence and intervention of Europeans despite their oppressive and exploitative nature (Hägerdal, 2012).

Local kingdoms in East Flores such as the Kingdom of Larantuka and Adonara had established diplomatic relations with Europeans in the late 16th century through trade and political networks. The initial arrival of the Portuguese in East Nusa Tenggara was through traders and Dominican priests arriving in Solor. In addition, a competitor, the VOC, intervened by attacking the Portuguese fort at Lohayong in 1613. After the attack, the Portuguese retreated in the Larantuka region and established diplomacy with the King of Larantuka. Meanwhile, the VOC signed a political agreement with Muslim leaders (Sengaji) from an alliance of five villages called wetan lema including Adonara, Terong and Lamahala in Adonara, Lohayong and Lamakera in Solor. These Muslim leaders (Sengaji) were considered by the VOC as important allies to achieve their political-economic goals. Meanwhile, the Portuguese spread the influence of Catholicism in Larantuka and allied themselves with the local Kings (Barnes, 2005, 2009).

The Portuguese influence on the Larantuka Kingdom was not only through political-economic diplomacy but also through religious influence. The Portuguese through Catholic missionaries spread the influence of Catholicism on the King and the people of Larantuka. The King of Larantuka Ola Ado Bala accepted and followed the Catholicism brought by the Portuguese missionaries. After King Ola Ado Bala became a Catholic, the people of Larantuka followed to believe in the new religion, as well as signaling the transition from the local Lamaholot belief of Rera-wulan Tana-ekan to Catholicism (Kebingin & Martasudjita, 2022).

The dominance of the Catholic religious element in Larantuka, this was utilized by the Portuguese to build influence and diplomacy for the interests and goals of the state with the Larantuka Kingdom through Catholic priests and missionaries. After the Portuguese Fort in Solor was controlled by the VOC in 1613, Larantuka was made by the Portuguese as its colony. The Portuguese used Catholic priests to strengthen their influence and interests related to the Estado da India project. Catholic priests became village leaders who were respected by the population in several Catholic villages of Larantuka. These Catholic priests were able to influence and empathize with the local population to support Portuguese interests and resist VOC rule in East Flores. Through the Catholic Priests, the Portuguese armed the people of Larantuka with bows, shields, swords and some firearms (Hägerdal, 2012).

Diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Larantuka and the Portuguese were also through mixed marriages between white Portuguese and the local population. This marriage route aimed to maintain the economic-political dominance, Portuguese culture and language as well as a strong Catholic identity in the colony. Mixed marriages between the Portuguese and the Larantuka population began in 1613 after the attack of Fort Henricus on Solor by the VOC. The Larantuka area was known as an escape area for Europeans, especially the Portuguese who defected and opposed the VOC at that time. This mixed marriage gave rise to a community called Larantuqueiros or Topas (Andaya, 2010; Hägerdal, 2012).

The black Portuguese community, commonly referred to as the Topas, were able to control the Larantuka region of East Flores during this period (Hägerdal, 2012). The Topas had two power bases, one in Lifau on the North Coast of Timor led by Mateus da Costa and the other in Larantuka in East Flores led by Antonio Hornay. Although these two groups of Topas competed with each other, both groups had the same goal of fighting the VOC in Flores. In 1656, both groups of Topas troops fought against the VOC troops led by Arnoldus de Vlamingh van Oudtshoorn (Andaya, 2010).

The two Topas leaders Mateus da Costa (1653-72) and Antonio Hornay (1673-93) had different relationships with the white Portuguese. The white Dominican Portuguese were willing to ally with da Costa and the Topas of Lifiau but rejected relations with the Topas of Larantuka led by Hornay. In particular, when Hornay led a battle with Ade's forces on the northeast coast of Timor. Hornay's forces allied themselves with the Konga, Sikka and Ugi in the eastern part of the island of Flores. Later, when Hornay was appointed Captain Major to replace da Costa the white Portuguese still refused to ally with him (Andaya, 2010). This position increased Hornay's social status and allowed him to expand his political influence in East Flores (Abdurachman, 2008).

Antonio Hornay also used marriage to the daughter of a local king to capitalize on his political diplomacy and influence in East Flores. Hornay married the daughter of the King of Ambeno in Timor. The purpose of this marriage was to strengthen his power and influence and expand Antonio Hornay's territory in East Flores (Heuken, 2002; Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014).

During his tenure as Captain Major in Larantuka, Antonio Hornay demonstrated his capacity as a local leader who dared to challenge Portuguese rule. This courage attracted the sympathy of the Topas people in East and Central Flores, and they were loyal and respectful to Hornay (Andaya, 2010). In 1655 Antonio Hornay was appointed capitao-mor de timor. This position also made his successors the uncrowned Kings of Timor (Abdurachman, 2008).

In 1677, Antonio Hornay rejected the official representative of the Portuguese empire and the Viceroy of Goa, João Antunes, who was sent to the Lifau region as Captain Major. With Hornay's refusal, João Antunes did not take up his position in Lifau and returned to Goa, India (Andaya, 2010; Heuken, 2002). Antonio Hornay demonstrated his capacity as King of Larantuka when he was able to establish relations with local rulers and even established relations with the VOC through the sandalwood trade network to be sent to the Dutch in Kupang. Therefore, Antonio Hornay was considered an adept leader in utilizing international relations to strengthen his position and power and was able to defeat Portuguese power in the Lifau region (Andaya, 2010).

Using his reputation as King of Larantuka, Antonio Hornay was able to monopolize the economically lucrative sandalwood trade (Abdurachman, 2008). In addition, Hornay was able to establish relations with the ruler of Buton to help control the Solor region. He also requested military ships from the Bugis rulers of Bone, South Sulawesi, to protect the coastal areas of Flores from attacks by the Bima rulers of Sumbawa Island. The influence and power of Antonio Hornay as King of Larantuka made the Larantuka Kingdom's power expand to include Central and Eastern Flores, parts of the islands of Adonara, Solor and Lembata, and most of Eastern and Western Timor. This also affected the Topas people, who were considered a military force to be reckoned with in the late 17th and early 18th centuries (Andaya, 2010).

Antonio Hornay's death in 1693 marked the decline of the Topas and the d'Hornay family in Flores. Later, when A. De Mesquita Pimentel temporarily seized power in 1696, it weakened the political power of the d'Hornay family. After the death of Antonio Hornay, the da Costa family's power began to rise again with the help of the Dominicans. By 1700, the da Costa family's power covered all of Flores except Kupang, which was controlled by the VOC. With this power, the da Costa family was able to make the Lifau region a political, military and Catholic center that surpassed the Larantuka region (Abdurachman, 2008).

In 1749 the power and influence of the Hornay and Costa families of the Topas began to weaken when they lost their battle against the VOC in West Timor. This battle had an impact on their networks and trading relationships with foreign traders. After the end of the battle, traders from Macau were afraid to trade in the Timor region. This led to economic losses and the weakening of the trade network system in the region which was previously dominated by the Topas. Therefore, during the mid to late 18th century, the influence and power of the Topas in the Flores region was limited (Hägerdal, 2007).

Based on the context of power dynamics in the Flores region, especially Larantuka in the pre-colonial period to the early modern period, it is related to the concept of a grand strategy. In this period it can be said that diplomacy and military power can influence the constitutional system, goals and continuity of power of a country. Therefore, building alliances with local elites and rulers could benefit both the Portuguese and the VOC. Especially in terms of power, politics and economics related to the sandalwood commodity in the Timor Coastal region.

On the other hand, local rulers and elites in the region also gained economic benefits, military protection and political position from relations with the Portuguese and the VOC at that time (Hägerdal, 2012). This was also influenced by the role and position of the King in Larantuka who was very strong so that he was able to establish diplomatic relations, build trade networks, mobilize military forces and declare war with local and foreign competitors (Barnes, 2008b).

The peak of the alliance between the Kingdom of Larantuka and the Portuguese occurred during the reign of King Dom Lorenzo Diaz Vieira Godinho I in 1831. King Dom Lorenzo Diaz Vieira Godinho also had the title of Portuguese Colonel. During his reign, this king required his people to speak Portuguese and Lamaholot (Barnes, 2008b). However, during the reign of King Dom Lorenzo Diaz Viera Godinho II in 1887-1904, the Larantuka Kingdom experienced a decline caused by the lack of capacity of the leader or King, internal and external conflicts and the unstable political system of government (Barnes, 2008a).

The golden age of the Larantuka kingdom ended in 1859 when the Portuguese were forced to cede Flores to the Dutch after lengthy negotiations. The Dutch wanted Flores because they saw its economic and strategic potential as a trade route for spices and sandalwood. The Dutch then took over the government of the Larantuka Kingdom and turned it into a regency led by a Dutch resident (Pradjoko & Kartika, 2014).

1. **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, the rise and decline of the Larantuka Kingdom can be attributed to a complex interplay of political and economic factors. Politically, the kingdom's strategic alliances with colonial powers such as the Portuguese initially bolstered its influence in the region, granting it access to vital trade routes and protection from rival powers. However, over time, these same alliances became detrimental, as the growing dominance of external forces weakened Larantuka’s sovereignty and autonomy. Economically, the kingdom's prosperity was deeply tied to its role as a trade hub, particularly in the sandalwood and spice trades. Yet, as global trade dynamics shifted and competition intensified, Larantuka's economic base eroded, leading to its gradual decline. The kingdom’s inability to adapt to these changing conditions both politically and economically eventually culminated in its diminished influence and eventual absorption into broader colonial structures. Thus, the history of the Larantuka Kingdom underscores the profound impact of external pressures and internal limitations on the fate of Southeast Asian polities during the colonial era.

The rise and decline of the Larantuka Kingdom is related to the concept of grand strategy theory. Conceptually, this theory can be used to analyze the success and failure of power in a country. The state power depends on non-military and military elements integrated through state policy. State policy has an impact on the achievement of state goals but also depends on the capacity of state leaders. This strategy aims to maintain power and gain economic benefits through diplomacy and strengthening the state system with the help of military forces. The concept of this grand strategy is indirectly found in the traditional state system of the Larantuka Kingdom and has an impact on the dynamics of power and the influence and goals of this kingdom in the economic-political and military fields during the period of its emergence to its destruction.

**V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The authors thank *Direktorat Riset Teknologi dan Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat, Kementerian Pendidikan Tinggi Sains dan Teknologi* (Directorate of Research Technology and Social Empowerment, Indonesian Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology) for the funding under the research scheme of *Penelitian Fundamental Reguler* 2024 (The 2024 Regular Fundamental Research). This funding also allows the authors to conduct research entitled “Negara Tradisional di Nusa Tenggara: Studi Komparasi Kerajaaan di Lombok dan Larantuka” (Traditional States in the Lesser Sunda Islands: Comparative Studies on the Kingdoms of Lombok and Larantuka).. It also facilitates the authors’ publication of this paper.

**VI. REFERENCES**

1. Abdurachman, P. R. (2008). Bunga Angin Portugis di Nusantara: Jejak-jejak Kebudayaan Portugis di Nusantara. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.
2. Adil, B. bin. (1974). The History of Malacca During the Period of the Malay Sultanate. Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia.
3. Agatha, A. (2016). Traditional Wisdom in Land Use and Resource Management Among the Lugbara of Uganda: A Historical Perspective. Sage Open, 6(3), 2158244016664562. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244016664562
4. Andaya. (1993). The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period. University of Hawaii Press.
5. Andaya, L. Y. (2010). The ‘informal Portuguese empire’ and the Topasses in the Solor archipelago and Timor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 41(3), 391–420. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002246341000024X
6. Aritonang, J. S., & Steenbrink, K. A. (2008). A History of Christianity in Indonesia. BRILL.
7. Barnes, R. H. (1982). The Majapahit dependency Galiyao. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90003461
8. Barnes, R. H. (1987). Weaving and non‐weaving among the Lamaholot. Indonesia Circle. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03062848708729658
9. Barnes, R. H. (2005). Hongi Hinga and its implications; A war of colonial consolidation in the Timor residence in 1904. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90003713
10. Barnes, R. H. (2008a). Raja Lorenzo II A Catholic kingdom in the Dutch East Indies. I I A S N E W S L E T T E R.
11. Barnes, R. H. (2008b). The Power of Strangers in Flores and Timor. Anthropos, 103(2), 343–353.
12. Barnes, R. H. (2009). A temple, a mission, and a war: Jesuit missionaries and local culture in East Flores in the nineteenth century. Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde, 165(1), 32–61.
13. Boxer, C. R. (1968). Fidalgos in the Far East 1550-1770. Oxford U.P.
14. Carta de Pedro de Faria, capitão de Malaca, ao rei D. João III, sobre a fortaleza de Malaca, sobre Banda, Molucas e outros assuntos. (1517). Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/viewer?id=4509584
15. Carta de Rui de Brito Patalim, capitão de Malaca, para Afonso de Albuquerque, governador das Índias, sobre a situação de Malaca. (1514). Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/viewer?id=3768897
16. Carta do Padre Baltasar Dias ao Padre Provincial da India, Malaca. (1559). DPHMPPOI.
17. Cribb, R. B., & Kahin, A. (2004). Historical Dictionary of Indonesia. Scarecrow Press.
18. de Graaf, H. J., & Pigeaud, T. G. T. (1985). Kerajaan-Kerajaan Islam di Jawa: Peralihan dari Majapahit ke Mataram. http://archive.org/details/de-graaf-kerajaan-islam-di-jawa
19. Dilley, A. (2013). The Politics of Commerce: The Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire, 1886-1914. Sage Open, 3(4), 2158244013510304. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244013510304
20. Elius, M., Khan, I., Mohd Nor, M. R., Muneem, A., Mansor, F., & Yakub @ Zulkifli Bin Mohd Yusoff, M. (2020). Muslim Treatment of Other Religions in Medieval Bengal. Sage Open, 10(4), 2158244020970546. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244020970546
21. Hägerdal, H. (2007). Colonial or indigenous rule? The black Portuguese of Timor in the 17th and 18th centuries. https://hdl.handle.net/1887/12515
22. Hägerdal, H. (2012). Lords of the Land, Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600-1800. Brill. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h178
23. Hall, K. R. (1985). Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia. University of Hawaii Press.
24. Hashim, M. Y. (1989). Kesultanan Melayu Melaka: Kajian Beberapa Aspek Tentang Melaka Pada Abad Ke 15 Dan Abad Ke 16 Dalam Sejarah Malaysia. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia.
25. Herlina, N. (2020). Metode Sejarah. Satya Historika.
26. Heuken, A. (2002). Be My Witness to the Ends of the Earth!: The Catholic Church in Indonesia Before the 19th Century. Cipta Loka Caraka.
27. Hurit, S. (2015). Kumpulan cerita rakyat Flores Timur (Lamaholot). Penerbit Nusa Indah.
28. Jebarus, E. (2017). Sejarah Keuskupan Larantuka. Ledalero.
29. Kebingin, B. Y., & Martasudjita, E. (2022). A Local Wisdom in East Flores and the Shift: The Transition of the Lamaholot Religion to the Catholic Religion. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.92.11747
30. Kerans, H. (2016). Metafora Tradisi Lisan Tutur Sejarah Lamaholot, Tradisi Lisan Masyarakat Flores Timur dan Lembata. Nusa Indah.
31. Lobato, M. (1999). Política e comércio dos portugueses na insulíndia: Malaca e as Molucas de 1575 a 1605. Instituto Português do Oriente.
32. Lombard, D. (1986). Kerajaan Aceh: Jaman Sultan Iskandar Muda,1607-1636. Balai Pustaka.
33. Manggala, P. U. (2013). The Mandala Culture of Anarchy: The Pre-Colonial Southeast Asian International Society. JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies), 1(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v1i1.764
34. Maran, O. C. D., Santosa, H., & Ernawati, J. (2022). Citra Destinasi Wisata Religi Berdasarkan Pengalaman Wisata pada Prosesi Semana Santa di Kota Larantuka. Journal on Education, 5(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.31004/joe.v5i1.688
35. Matos, A. T. D. (1995). Portugal on the Seaway to Spices (First Edition). Imrensa Nacional-Casa Da Moeda.
36. Meilink-Roelofsz, M. A. P. (1962). Asian Trade and European Influence: In the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630. Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8850-0
37. Meilink-Roelofsz, M. A. P. (2016). PERSAINGAN EROPA DAN ASIA DI NUSANTARA: Sejarah Perniagaan 1500-1630 (1st ed.). Komunitas Bambu.
38. Munandar, A. A. (2020). Majapahit and the Contemporary Kingdoms: Interactions and Views. Berkala Arkeologi, 40(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.30883/jba.v40i1.522
39. Onea, T. A. (2020). The Grand Strategies of Great Powers. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315268378
40. Pinto, F. M. (1829). Peregrinação de Fernão Mendez Pinto. Typographia Rollandiana.
41. Pires, T. (with McGill University Library). (1944). The Suma oriental of Tomé Pires: An account of the East, from the Red Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515 ; and, the book of Francisco Rodrigues, rutter of a voyage in the Red Sea, nautical rules, almanack and maps, written and drawn in the East before 1515. London : The Hakluyt Society. http://archive.org/details/McGillLibrary-136385-182
42. Pradjoko, D. (2017). From Stranded Praos ‘up to’ People Trailed by the Sea Stream: A Study about the Maritime Oral Tradition as a Source in the Writing about the Migration History in the Region of the Sawu Sea in the Lesser Sunda Islands. Journal of Maritime Studies and National Integration, 1(2), 78–94.
43. Pradjoko, D., & Kartika, F. I. (2014). Pelayaran dan perdagangan kawasan Laut Sawu: Abad ke-18-awal abad ke-20. Wedatama Widyasastra.
44. Ricklefs, M. C. (2007). Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2004 (Third). PT. Serambi Ilmu Semesta.
45. Samingan, S., & Roe, Y. T. (2021). KEDATANGAN BANGSA PORTUGIS: BERDAGANG DAN MENYEBARKAN AGAMA KATOLIK DI NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR. Historis : Jurnal Kajian, Penelitian Dan Pengembangan Pendidikan Sejarah, 6(1), 18–24. https://doi.org/10.31764/historis.v6i1.4441
46. Shellabear, W. G. (1989). Sejarah Melayu / diusahakan oleh W. G. Shellabear. Fajar Bakti.
47. Smith, R. B. (1970). The First Age of the Portuguese Embassies, Navigations and Peregrinations in Persia (1507-1524). Decatur Press, Inc. http://archive.org/details/firstageofportug0000rona
48. Starr, H. (1993). [Review of Review of Grand Strategies in War and Peace, by P. Kennedy]. The American Political Science Review, 87(1), 261–261. https://doi.org/10.2307/2939032
49. Surya, R. A., & Puji, R. P. N. (2024). The Geopolitics of Java in the 17th Century: A Case Study of Mataram Sultanate. Paramita: Historical Studies Journal, 34(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.15294/paramita.v34i2.47748
50. Teixeira, M. (1963). The Portuguese Missions in Malacca and Singapore (1511-1958): Singapore. Agência Geral do Ultramar.
51. Tokan, A. K. H. (2023). Agama Koda. Nilacakra.
52. Tokan, F. (2023). Nubanara Peninggalan Megalitik Masyarakat Lewolema Adonara. Nusa Indah.
53. Vatter, E. (1984). Ata Kiwan. Nusa Indah.
54. Villiers, J. (1985). East of Malacca: Three Essays on the Portuguese in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.
55. Wey, A. L. K., & Harun, A. L. (2018). Grand strategy of the Malacca Sultanate, 1400–1511. Comparative Strategy, 37(1), 49–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2017.1419726
56. Wijaya, D. N. (2022). Malacca Beyond European Colonialism (15th-17th Centuries). https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/141531
57. Wolters, O. W. (1967). Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Srīvijaya. Cornell University Press.
58. Yoseph, M. P. (2010). Identifikasi Citra Fisik Kota Larantuka Kabupaten Flores Timur berdasarkan BUdaya Portugis [Skripsi, Institut Teknologi Nasional Malang]. https://eprints.itn.ac.id/10855/