**Asia’s Absence from The Impact of The Ukrainian-Russian War on Global Supply Chains: A Call to Global IR Advancing**

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**ABSTRACT:** This study is motivated by the dominance of Western narratives in analyzing the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on global supply chains, often overlooking the strategic role of the Asian region. The purpose of this research is to explore the contributions of Asian countries and assess how the global International Relations (IR) approach can be reshaped through regional perspectives. A qualitative descriptive method was employed, utilizing primary data such as official policy documents and statements from Asian countries including China, Japan, South Korea, and regional institutions like ASEAN, APEC, World Economic Forum on Asian Counties and etc. Secondary data were gathered from academic journals, international reports, and current news sources. The findings reveal that Asia has played a vital role in maintaining global supply chain stability by adopting cautious yet constructive policies during the conflict. The discussion highlights that the global IR approach must shift from a hierarchical, Western-centric framework to one that is more inclusive and context-sensitive. Asia’s emphasis on regional autonomy and its critique of double standards represent a valuable contribution to reshaping global norms. Thus, regional dynamics should serve as a foundation for constructing global understanding in IR, rather than using the global as a lens to define regional life.

Keywords: global IR, Asia, Ukraine-Russia war, global supply chain

1. **INTRODUCTION**

Global IR offers significant potential, particularly for examining the Ukraine-Russia war through an inclusive and diverse perspective in the spirit of international pluralism. The global IR review in this context focuses on how mainstream and traditional approaches are situated within their respective domains to explain the diversity of global experiences (Anderl & Witt, 2020; Maliniak et al., 2018; Zhang & Buzan, 2022). Initially, global IR allows for European and North American priorities to be considered separately, while other regions can voice alternative perspectives. The need to hear global IR voices is crucial so that the ‘global’ label is not monopolized by Western experiences and instead reflects a comprehensive view of global realities (Eun, 2019). The embrace of pluralism by global IR for Asia can be seen in its flexibility for addressing needs and articulating perspectives in today’s global context.

The Ukraine-Russia war, which began in 2022, has disrupted global supply chains, affecting various sectors, from energy to food production. Europe, North America, and parts of Africa have borne the brunt of this disruption, as they are reliant on exports from Ukraine and Russia (Dyson et al., 2023; Jagtap et al., 2022). What is particularly intriguing, however, is that Asia, as an economic powerhouse and key player in global trade, has remained relatively insulated from these global supply chain disturbances (Srai et al., 2023). In reviewing the preliminary narrative of this article, it is essential to further consider how global IR theory positions itself to examine these supply chain disruptions from a structural perspective and to offer a more comprehensive framework for understanding Asia’s strategic role within the global network.

Europe and North America have dominated the discourse surrounding the global supply chain disruptions caused by the Ukraine-Russia war. The energy crisis, skyrocketing food prices, and resource shortages in these regions have shaped their narratives and policy responses (Ben Hassen & El Bilali, 2022; Hussein & Knol, 2023; Sun et al., 2024a). However, this Eurocentric and transatlantic focus has sparked concerns about the use of the term ‘global’, this controversy arises because the issues framed as global problems are primarily those affecting Europe and North America. While these regions grapple with critical disruptions, the experiences of other areas, particularly Asia, remain underrepresented (Davis, 2023; Singh, 2023). Global IR has long been a critic of labeling such issues as ‘global’ emphasizing how political frameworks tend to lean towards Western-centric experiences (Acharya, 2016; Bilgin, 2008; Hutchings, 2011).

Global supply chain, being complex networks involving numerous regions, require a global IR approach to fully understand vulnerabilities in the face of crises such as the Ukraine-Russia war. Traditional Western-centric models overlook the fact that the impact of such disruptions is not evenly distributed worldwide (Duclos, 2022). In the case of Asia, the region has demonstrated its ability to shield itself from many supply chain issues observed in Europe and North America (Bouchet, 2022; Kottasová, 2024). Global IR must be supported by accounting for regional differences and uncovering factors that significantly contribute to Asia’s stability during this crisis. Asia, as a region integrated into global trade routes, has maintained strategic autonomy to view global supply chain dynamics more holistically (Rahiman et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2023).

Asia’s role in maintaining the stability of global supply chains has been further solidified through collective initiatives within strategic forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Economic Forum on Asian Countries (Schwab, 2015; Canton, 2021). These forums serve not merely as platforms for economic coordination, but as vehicles for articulating regional interests that are often marginalized in Western-centric discourses. APEC, with its agenda of trade liberalization and economic integration, demonstrates that Asia’s consensus-based cooperation can produce structural resilience independent of the transatlantic bloc (Killian & Aminuddin, 2022). Meanwhile, the World Economic Forum on Asia Countries has become a strategic arena where Asia’s political and economic elites challenge the assumptions of the liberal international order and formulate alternative narratives that better reflect global complexity. Through these forums, Asia is not only exhibiting resilience in the face of crises such as the Russia-Ukraine war but also asserting itself as a generator of global discourse—rather than merely a subject of Western-constructed global narratives (Davalos, 2016).

Europe and North America are currently facing significant disruptions in their supply chains due to the direct impact of the Ukraine-Russia war (Wike et al., 2024; Zinchenko, 2024). They seem to be experiencing what could be described as a ‘curse’ of their dominance in shaping the global narrative. Their dependence on energy imports, essential materials, and agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia has rendered those regions vulnerable (Hamilton, 2023). As this vulnerability shifts northward, Asia maintains a diverse regionally integrated supply chain. While Asia is not without its dilemmas and disruptions, the narrative strength and historical issues faced by the region are not a severe as the challenges encountered by the Northern world due to deep-seated conflicts and security visions.

Asia’s advantage in global supply chains is rooted in strategic diversification, regional cooperation, and resilience observed across various countries in the region, which have now become key players in geostrategic landscape known as the Indo-Pacific. China, for instance, stands at the center of global manufacturing, having developed an extensive supply network through intra-Asia connections, thus reducing deep-seated dependencies (Fan, 2024). Other Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, have focused on enhancing technology investments and efficient logistics systems, allowing them to swiftly adapt to shifting global demands (Gu Ho, 2022; Hoekman et al., 2013; Hosoe, 2023; Mardones, 2023). Additionally, Southeast Asia, with countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, has emerged as a significant player in global supply chains, particularly in electronics and textiles, bolstered by strong partnerships through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and ASEAN (Anas et al., 2022; Duong et al., 2023; Mat Enh et al., 2024).

The West, represented by Europe and North America, finds itself in a precarious position regarding sanctions imposed on Russia, while simultaneously needing to weigh the unintended consequences of these actions (Milov, 2024). This dynamic has exposed double standards, where Western countries seek to hold Russia accountable through international means, yet remain dependent on Russian energy and resources (Babina et al., 2023). Global IR has long criticized this standardization, highlighting how the liberal international order often serves as a shield that transcends universally recognized norms (Börzel & Zürn, 2021; Lake et al., 2021; Stephen & Skidmore, 2019; Stokes, 2018). This situation creates a problematic and contentious narrative surrounding the ‘global’ label in Western contexts, especially as numerous factors are imposed on the ‘Rest’ of the world.

The global IR perspective critically examines the liberal international order, acknowledging its strong foundations in free markets, democratic governance, and multilateral cooperation (Bettiza et al., 2023; Rumelili & Towns, 2022). Additionally, global IR critiques the post-Cold War order, which has led to pseudo-alliances following NATO, resulting in assessments that complicate the international environment. Global IR repositions how Asia within this landscape reflects autonomous political and economic paradigms, this is evident from various assessments of Asian initiatives that are perceived as contrary to the current global regime (Chen, 2011; Eun, 2022; Eun & Pieczara, 2013). Ultimately, global IR strengthens its approach by focusing on the experiences of the West through the resources and on-the-ground facts of Asia, highlighting what is needed and what must be done.

The shift in the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific is not a significant challenge to the standardization of the liberal international order when viewed from the global IR perspective. On the contrary, the positive aspect is reflected in how Asian countries maintain autonomy and middle power dynamics to remain neutral (Dharmaputra, 2023; Thakkar, 2024). The active contributions of Asia to global supply chains present a significant opportunity for global IR to strengthen its approach by addressing what has been overlooked in Asia. By considering the perspectives and efforts of Asian countries as examples, and challenging the European-centric ‘global’ label, global IR can pave the way for broader voices and insights in the future.

Previous research on the Ukraine-Russia war has largely been framed within a Western-centric context with a ‘global’ label, leading to an increasingly dominant narrative centered on the United States and its allies, the West (Balbaa et al., 2022; Cui et al., 2023; El Bilali & Ben Hassen, 2024; Hubatka et al., 2022; Hussein & Knol, 2023; Markus, 2022; Sohag et al., 2023; Yugay et al., 2024). Such a focus tends to overshadow the global dimensions of the conflict, creating a perception that the war’s consequences are deemed ‘global’ only when they affect Western crisis. In reality, the global order has evolved beyond this issue due to interconnections, alternative cooperation networks, and transcontinental trade routes (Acharya, 2017; Brinkerink et al., 2018; Farrell & Newman, 2019). This narrative tendency has highlighted the impact on the West while neglecting other regions, particularly Asia, which plays a crucial role in global trade.

The primary impetus for investigating Asia’s absence is to include it in the global narrative concerning the Russia-Ukraine war’s impact on global supply chains, from the perspective of global IR (MacDonald, 2014; Rotter et al., 2014). This gap needs to be addressed with the understanding that the global lens is not exclusively Western-centric, rather for Asia can offer valuable insights into the current situation. This article aims to challenge and expand the scope of global IR beyond previous cultural and historical focuses (Acharya, 2019; Acharya & Buzan, 2019). By examining Asia’s position as a central and major player in global trade, there is no justification for excluding this region from mainstream discussions. This approach will advance global IR to be more balanced and comprehensive.

By adopting a global IR approach to address the underrepresentation of Asia in the discourse on the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war on global supply chains, this article will seek to explore the theoretical strengths that can be developed and to examine Asian states within this context. The decision to utilize a global IR framework facilitates an inclusive analysis that is integrative rather than monopolistic.

1. **METHOD**

This research uses a qualitative approach with descriptive methods to factually and systematically describe the characteristics and dynamics occurring in the context of the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on global supply chains, with a particular focus on the underrepresentation of Asia in global discourse on this impact. This approach was chosen to answer the research questions by generating in-depth, contextual, and comprehensive insights, thereby capturing the geopolitical and economic complexities more fully. The data sources in this study consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with international relations experts, industry players, and economic analysts in the Asian region, and through observations of international policy forums discussing global supply chain issues. Secondary data include policy documents, official reports, scholarly articles, and archives from institutions such as the World Economic Forum Asia and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which document Asia's response to the global dynamics triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

To increase the validity and credibility of the findings, this study employs data triangulation techniques, namely comparing and verifying information from various sources (primary and secondary) and across perspectives, to obtain a more objective and in-depth picture. This triangulation allows researchers to capture congruences and discrepancies between empirical field observations and the theoretical framework used. The data analysis process follows the stages in Miles and Huberman's model: data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing/verification. The data reduction stage is carried out to filter the most relevant information regarding Asia's contributions and challenges in maintaining its strategic position in global supply chains during conflict. Next, the data is systematically presented to demonstrate the interrelationships between international political dynamics, regional economic stability, and the roles of Asian actors. Conclusions are drawn critically to build a solid argument for the importance of a more inclusive Global International Relations (Global IR) approach to non-Western perspectives, particularly Asian ones.

1. **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

**Ukraine and Russia in The Indo-Pacific or Asia Perspectives**

Asia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific are terms used interchangeably, but each refers to distinct geopolitical and geoeconomics area with unique characteristics. Asia denotes the continent itself, unified by Asian nationalism, while the Asia-Pacific represents a blend of the Asian continent and the Pacific region, often discussed by economic experts. Indo-Pacific is a construct developed by strategic communities (Acharya, 2024). This region has long grappled with security dilemmas stemming from Western standardization and assessments, but it is global IR that has highlighted the uniqueness of the region as an autonomous practice in international affairs.

In this context, forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Economic Forum Asia serve as crucial instruments for Asian countries to assert their identities and regional interests within the diverse geopolitical constructions of Asia, Asia-Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific. APEC, which encompasses countries across the Asia-Pacific region, reflects cross-continental economic interests that emphasize regional cooperation, open trade, and inclusive development without being dominated by security imperatives. In contrast, the Indo-Pacific—as a strategic construct—is often associated with security dynamics and great power rivalry. However, through platforms like WEF Asia, Asian nations have been able to reframe such discourse toward sustainable economic cooperation, technological innovation, and structural transformation grounded in regional experience. Both APEC and WEF Asia offer space for Asian countries to reposition themselves not merely as recipients of global policy but as normative actors with agency in shaping the international agenda, thereby demonstrating that regional pluralism is a key element in a Global International Relations (IR) approach that is inclusive and reflective of global diversity.

Asian countries are divided in their responses to the Ukraine-Russia war, reflecting their respective alliances, interests, and historical ties. In Northeast Asia, the divergence in responses among countries is particularly pronounced. For instance, Japan and South Korea have adhered to the hub-and-spokes model, where the dominant power, the United States, supports Ukraine, and these hub countries align with this support (Kavanagh, 2024; Pugliese, 2024; Snyder, 2024). In contrast, China and North Korea present a different portrayal. China, in particular, is frequently viewed as a rival to the liberal international order and as a competitor of the United States in trade and political culture issues (Chestnut Greitens, 2022).

China and North Korea, although maintaining a neutral stance, are often perceived as supportive of Russia due to hierarchical liberalism. China, for instance, refrains from openly criticizing Russia, driven by broader political and economic interests (Freeman et al., 2023; Huasheng, 2023). North Korea is notably more supportive of Russia, aiming to strengthen its alliance with Moscow (Davenport, 2024). These facts, particularly in Northeast Asia, reveal that countries are inclined to view the Ukraine-Russia war through the lens of their own interests rather than purely through strategic alliances like the hub-and-spokes model, with the exception of North Korea.

China’s position in the Ukraine-Russia war is less influenced by political decisions to support either side and more driven by pragmatic needs to maintain stability in global supply chains (Pomfret, 2023; Zhou et al., 2023). Both Russia and Ukraine are crucial to China. Russia is a major supplier of energy, particularly natural gas and oil, while Ukraine is important for its agricultural exports, especially grains (Dodd et al., 2024; IEA 50, 2022). Additionally, Ukraine serves as a significant source of military technology for China (Sacks, 2022). Ultimately, economic dependency is far more critical for China than aligning itself with either side in the conflict. Disruptions in trade with Russia or Ukraine are viewed by China in the same way as disruptions in Europe and North America.

Japan and South Korea, despite aligning with the West and openly supporting Ukraine, do not focus heavily on the Ukraine-Russia war. For Japan, energy security is a primary concern due to its reliance on oil and natural gas to meet domestic needs (Cahill et al., 2024). Japan carefully navigates its sanctions on Russia while managing its energy trade relationships, and it maintains trade ties with Ukraine, particularly in the automotive and electronics sectors (Cilliers, 2024). Similarly, South Korea’s position mirrors Japan’s. The country relies on Russia for resources like oil, coal, and metals, while it needs manufacturing and technology from Ukraine (Korgun, 2023). Although South Korea supports international sanctions against Russia, it must balance these actions with its economic interests in both countries.

The responses and realities faced by Northeast Asian countries actually reinforce several aspects of the global IR approach. First, these countries understand how rules and norms within the global order operate but also need to navigate their interests autonomously (Ha & Shin, 2022; Pacheco Pardo & Kim, 2022). Second, Northeast Asian countries recognize that the Ukraine-Russia war is not merely about supporting one side or following a NATO-centric Western tradition (Boyle & Iwashita, 2021; Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). These facts should be bolstered by examining the mutually beneficial interactions, particularly regarding global supply chains. The need for economic interdependence and global trade routes should be integrated into global IR thinking, alongside developing cultural and historical values.

Turning to ASEAN, the Southeast Asian institution has also engaged in examining the Ukraine-Russia war’s impact on global supply chains, though not through direct partisanship (Kliem, 2024). Collectively, ASEAN countries largely avoid taking a firm stance on the conflict. This is reflected in their concerns as part of their deep integrations into global supply chains, particularly in manufacturing, agriculture, and energy (Passeri, 2023; Saha, 2022). ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, are heavily dependent on imported raw materials and agricultural products. This reliance drives many ASEAN nations to focus on mitigating indirect consequences rather than taking explicit positions on the conflict (Lubis et al., 2023).

Emphasizing the complex interdependencies and diverse regional perspectives, global IR’s response to the Ukraine-Russia war prioritizes economic considerations over political alignments. This conflict is viewed not solely through the lens of geopolitical alliances but also through the specific needs and autonomous behaviors of the mentioned Asian countries (Kolmaš, 2018; MacKay, 2019). This pragmatic approach represents a different kind of balancing compared to traditional realist perspectives, as global IR reveals that there are issues beyond the Ukraine-Russia war that warrant attention. The consequence of applying this approach, from the perspective of Asian countries, is a shift from traditional alliance-based thinking to a more nuanced focus on national and regional economic interests.

**Effort from ‘The Rest’ in This War and The Imagination of Transition**

As Asia navigates the implications of the Russia-Ukraine war amid geopolitical transitions, balancing standardization with respect for autonomy in decision-making is crucial. Global IR acknowledges the importance of global norms whole upholding the sovereignty of nations and now emphasizes a collective mission to maintain global supply chain stability through a shared perspective on the international system (Cunliffe & Kenkel, 2016). As highlighted, Asian countries have asserted their autonomy in responding to the Ukraine-Russia war, with approaches linked to regional strategic priorities.

China has adopted a pragmatic approach to maintain the stability of global supply chains amid the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war, recognizing the importance of uninterrupted trade routes and understanding that economic growth relies on awareness and policy regarding this issue (Chang-Liao, 2023; Mendez et al., 2022). One of the rational drivers for China’s pragmatic stance is its position as a global manufacturing powerhouse, which necessitates substantial energy and food resources from both Ukraine and Russia. Theoretical assessments of China’s potential actions and strategies are often misunderstood and viewed with suspicions. However, global IR would regard this as a sound strategic review (Prantl & Goh, 2022).

The advantage of China, which should be acknowledged by global IR approaches, is how its Belt and Road Initiative can serve as an alternative market to maintain the stability of global supply chains amidst the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war (Kivalov, 2023). Theoretical questions regarding the Belt and Road are often revolve around the global order currently in a phase of transition, or, more radically, as a counter to the Western free market order (Mendez et al., 2022; Verma & Düben, 2024). This narrative collapse when China benefits from the continued resilience of global supply chains, and the balancing concept of the Belt and Road proves to be more effective compared to the Western-centric perspective that views the world through traditional security aspects post-Cold War.

Turning to Japan and South Korea as two major allies of the West in the Northeast Asia region, both countries are striving to maintain the stability of global supply chains by seeking alternative markets in energy and raw materials with Middle Eastern countries (Sim, 2024). In this case, Japan and South Korea are cognizant of the Middle Eastern nations’ progress toward renewable or efficient energy sources (Olimat, 2023). On the other hand, their openness to exploring broader and non-singular markets represents a significant contribution to the proposal for safeguarding global supply chains. While China has established resilient alternative initiatives to face uncertainties, Japan and South Korea have strategically developed potential for diplomatic solutions by identifying other markets in different regions, thus avoiding entanglement in the vortex of conflict.

The institutional spirit and commitment to reinforcing multilateralism come from ASEAN, where the majority of its member countries seek a collaborative approach to maintain global supply chain stability amidst the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war (Flores et al., 2023; Seah, 2023). ASEAN has long prioritized regional cooperation and open dialogue to mitigate trade disruptions, particularly concerning their needs in energy and food. ASEAN’s emphasis on multilateralism and non-intervention allows this regional institution to engage with both Ukraine and Russia simultaneously without taking sides (Wardhani & Dharmaputra, 2024). This positive aspect of ASEAN may differ from China, Japan, and South Korea due to their adherence to non-interventionist values.

While ASEAN stands out for its principles of non-intervention and consensus-based multilateralism, the Asia-Pacific region, comprised of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), has demonstrated a more flexible and economically oriented approach in responding to the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war. APEC, as a regional economic forum encompassing countries with diverse political systems and strategic interests—including the United States, China, Japan, and ASEAN countries—focuses on regional economic stability by emphasizing trade integration, supply chain strengthening, and technological cooperation without becoming entangled in confrontational geopolitical dynamics. Unlike political or security forums, APEC does not have a mandate to take a position on international conflicts, but its strength lies in its ability to create a collaborative space across ideologies in addressing global challenges such as energy and food disruption. Within this framework, the Asia-Pacific, through APEC, contributes to global economic resilience by upholding the principles of inclusivity and equality, which aligns with the spirit of Global International Relations, which rejects the dominance of a single narrative and encourages a more pluralistic and transregional approach.

From the efforts of these Asian countries, the development of global IR lies in how to uphold good international standards while preserving the honor of autonomy. On the other hand, the proposal to establish an initiative that reaches out to a closer global world is a highly strategic stance in the face of this imagined uncertainty. As the liberal international order has been disrupted both domestically and globally, global IR focuses on this moderate stance (Onuf, 2016). Undoubtedly, in such a world, collaboration and diplomacy are only feasible among nations with moderate tendencies.

**Why Does the Global Supply Chain Discussion Seem to West Belonging?**

Global supply chains are often depicted through a Western lens, reflecting Western priorities and economic needs rather than global or universal standards. A clear example of this is the West’s heavy reliance on wheat as a staple food in Europe and North America, which has been disrupted by the Russia-Ukraine war (Filho et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2023). In contrast, Asia relies predominantly on rice, which is produced and consumed domestically. Countries like China, India, and ASEAN nations can meet their own rice needs and even open up joint markets (Li et al., 2024; Reardon et al., 2014). It is evident from this perspective that the imposition of a ‘global’ label on the energy and food crises in not relevant to Asia.

The West consistently promotes renewable energy as a crucial solution for the global environmental governance, but it also applies double standards in this regard. In reality, Western countries still heavily depend on fossil fuels, particularly natural gas and oil from Russia. Meanwhile, Europe and North America, representing the West, have imposed sanctions on Russia that have, in turn, negatively impacted themselves (Sun et al., 2024b). In contrast, Japan and South Korea have made efforts to align with these standards by cooperating with Middle Eastern countries on renewable energy. In this instance, Asian representatives have demonstrated significant commitment amid the West’s uncertainties regarding the Ukraine-Russia war.

The perception that Asia does not contribute significantly to global supply chains is influenced by racial biases and historical narratives that have positioned Europe and North America as the centers of innovation and leadership in global supply chains. In Asia, this issue is rooted in a long history of colonialism and archaeological records that seemingly silence Asia’s ability to assert its autonomy and proposals (Sachsenmaier, 2006; Tae, 2014). Global IR has identified this as an intellectual gap, suggesting that now is a significant opportunity to boldly voice Asia’s advantages and contributions (Gelardi, 2020).

Global International Relations (Global IR) holds significant relevance in understanding the relative stability of Asian supply chains amidst the global disruption caused by the Russia-Ukraine war. Unlike mainstream International Relations approaches that tend to focus on Western experiences, Global IR emphasizes the importance of diverse perspectives and regional conditions as an integral part of global dynamics. In this context, the stability of Asian supply chains is not simply a result of economic resilience, but also a reflection of an adaptive and diverse regional cooperation architecture—from ASEAN's emphasis on non-intervention and multilateralism (Martinez-Marco, 2023), to the role of forums like APEC in facilitating trade integration and strengthening cross-regional logistics without geopolitical bias (Flores et al., 2023; Seah, 2023). Global IR allows this analysis to take place within a framework that avoids the dominance of Western crisis narratives and instead highlights how Asia has been able to build strategic autonomy through economic diversification, technological investment, and strong intra-regional networks (Zhang, 2023). Thus, the Global IR approach not only explains why Asia is relatively stable, but also corrects the epistemic imbalance in international relations studies that have so far ignored the resilience and complexity of non-Western regions in facing global crises.

To develop this issue into a strategic project for global IR, it is essential to articulate regional values based on overlooked facts. This is not intended to diminish Western dominance, but rather to foster a shared way of living that is necessary to represent today’s world as a vision for a better future. Key points that should be addressed include promptly assessing the current situation and exploring how global IR can serve as a foundation for amplifying neglected international practices.

1. **CONCLUSION**

In this article, the study of the Ukraine-Russia war’s impact on global supply chains from an Asian perspective must be emphasized, as the region has consistently been overshadowed by Western-centric narratives. It is clear that the approach needed to articulate Asia’s practices and responses is global IR, which can embrace overlooked facts, such as how Asian countries have made significant efforts to maintain the stability of global supply chains amid the ongoing war. With a spirit of pluralism, recognition of international standards, and respect for autonomy, significant contributions can be made to the global IR approach for further research, especially when grounded in overlooked facts. The global IR approach itself has motivated and encouraged voices from various regions to propose and seek better situations and practices, in addition to addressing dilemmas and double standards that have long been imposed by the West.

China, as a major power, has contributed by encouraging countries to consider alternative initiatives that can remain resilient in situations unfavorable to the proponents of established standards and hierarchical norms, namely the West. Japan and South Korea have also engaged in diplomacy aligned with renewable energy goals with other regions, thereby avoiding being swept up in the broader currents of the Ukraine-Russia war. Turning to ASEAN, the spirit of non-intervention and multilateralism has demonstrated that the war, as perceived by the West, does not necessarily warrant the alliances it seeks.

This study highlights the importance of advancing Global International Relations (Global IR) by using Asia’s experience as a key foundation for building a more inclusive and representative approach to international relations. Asia’s relative stability during the Russia-Ukraine war—especially in maintaining global supply chains—shows that the region is not just a passive player in the global system, but an active and strategic one. Through regional institutions like ASEAN, which promote multilateralism and non-intervention, and forums like APEC and the World Economic Forum Asia, which encourage cross-border economic cooperation, Asian countries have offered alternative ways to manage global crises—different from the Western or transatlantic response.

Finally, while there is no doubt about the need to critique the ‘global’ label from a Western interest perspective, it is equally important to highlight regional aspects. Comparing regional practices can serve as a proposal for creating a more resilient and robust global order that respects autonomy and enforces non-racist standards globally. The Ukraine-Russia war has demonstrated that the West need to engage in introspection and learn from Asia, which prioritizes stability and caution in responding to or addressing the conflict due to unavoidable long-term objectives.

Suggestions for further research could further develop how Global IR demonstrates Asia's performance as a strategic actor in the international system. Asia's stability in the face of global crises, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, demonstrates the region's capacity to maintain economic resilience and regional cooperation. Future research could focus on how Asian countries build solidarity, strengthen regional institutions like ASEAN and APEC, and create new models of international relations independent of Western frameworks.

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